

## Message Text

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ACTION PM-03

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ADP-00 NSC-10 NSCE-00 IO-03 OIC-01 L-02

CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 AEC-05 MBFR-02 ACDA-10

OMB-01 TRSE-00 EUR-10 NEA-06 PRS-01 SAJ-01 RSR-01

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R 201042 Z JUN 73

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5815

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USNMR SHAPE BRUSSELS

USDEL SALT

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 08785

LIMDIS

VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL; HELSINKI FOR MPT DEL; SHAPE FOR  
INTAF.

E. O. 11652: X- GDS-1

TAGS: PARM, GW

SUBJECT: MBFR: STATIONED/ INDIGENOUS FORCE REDUCTION  
ISSUE AFTER COPENHAGEN MINISTERIAL.

REF: BONN 8421

SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR' S CONVERSATION WITH EGON BAHR AND  
EMBOFF' S MEETING WITH GERMAN MBFR DEL CHIEF RUTH  
CONFIRM THE IMPRESSION GIVEN BY RECENT DPC STATEMENT  
OF DEFMIN LEBER AND NAC REMARKS OF FONMIN SCHEEL--  
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NAMELY, STRONG FRG PREFERENCE FOR US OPTION- I AND INCREASING STRENGTH OF THOSE GERMAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARGUING FOR SOME TYPE OF TREATMENT OF INDIGENOUS ( I. E. BUNDESWEHR) FORCES IN INITIAL MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. THESE GERMAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE PARTICULARLY STRENGTHENED BY THE STRONG SUPPORT AND ENHANCED MBFR ACTIVITY OF BAHR, WHOSE POSITION IS TIED TO THE AIM OF ASSYMMETRICAL CUTS IN SOVIET STATIONED TROOPS. AS IS EXPLAINED BELOW, THE FONOFF HOPES THAT THE COPENHAGEN STATEMENTS OF SCHEEL AND DUTCH FONMIN VAN DER STOEL COULD PROVIDE AN ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE FORMULATION. GIVEN THE ABOVE DEVELOPMENTS AND THE COMMENTS MADE TO EMBOFF BY BRITISH EMBASSY OFFICIAL, WE BELIEVE AN EFFORT TO SECURE GERMAN SUPPORT FOR INITIAL STATIONED FORCE CUT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD COME AT LEAST INITIALLY FROM OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES, AND WOULD HAVE TO BE AT THE HIGHEST POLITICAL LEVEL IF THEY ARE TO BE EFFECTIVE. END SUMMARY.

1. IN A CONVERSATION ON JUNE 19 WITH AMBASSADOR, MINISTER- WITHOUT- PORTFOLIO BAHR CONFIRMED THAT, NOW THAT THE MAJOR INITIATIVES IN EASTERN POLICY HAD BEEN TAKEN, HE PLANNED TO DEVOTE MORE OF HIS TIME TO ADVISING THE CHANCELLOR ON FORTHCOMING EAST/ WEST NEGOTIATIONS ON CSCE AND MBFR. AS FAR AS CSCE WAS CONCERNED, BAHR STATED FRANKLY THAT HE PERSONALLY REGARDED THE WHOLE EXERCISE AS ONE OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE, FROM WHICH THE WEST COULD HOPE TO GAIN VERY LITTLE. THE REALLY IMPORTANT SUBSTANCE WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE MBFR CONTEXT.

2. BAHR CLEARLY STATED HIS PREFERENCE FOR DISCUSSING INDIGENOUS REDUCTIONS AT THE SAME TIME AS STATIONED FORCE REDUCTIONS, ALTHOUGH THE FORMER MIGHT FOLLOW THE LATTER CHRONOLOGICALLY. IN THIS, HE LINED UP ESSENTIALLY WITH DEFMIN LEBER AGAINST THOSE IN THE FONOFF WHO FAVORED THE US POSITION OF CONCENTRATING FIRST ON STATIONED FORCES. HE GAVE THREE REASONS WHICH HE SAID CONVINCED HIM OF THE NECESSITY FOR CONSIDERING INDIGENOUS FORCE REDUCTIONS DURING THE FIRST PHASE OF MBFR DISCUSSIONS:

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( A) ASSUMING THAT OPTION- I ( POSSIBLY COMBINED WITH SOME VARIANT OF OPTION- III) OF THE US PROPOSALS WERE TO BE ADVANCED BY THE WESTERN SIDE, HE COULD NOT CONCEIVE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT ANY SORT OF FORCE CEILINGS WITH ASSYMMETRICAL IMPLICATIONS UNLESS THE BUNDESWEHR WERE INCLUDED. EVEN THEN, HE CONSIDERED IT UNLIKELY. FROM THE GERMAN

POINT OF VIEW, HE ADDED, OPTION- II WAS CLEARLY  
UNACCEPTABLE.

( B) ONLY BY ADOPTING THE COMMON CEILING APPROACH  
IN SUCH A WAY AS TO INCLUDE INDIGENOUS FORCES WAS  
THERE ANY HOPE OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE WESTERN  
SIDE AT THE SAME TIME ON MINIMUM FORCE LEVELS TO BE  
MAINTAINED. WITHOUT SUCH AGREEMENT, HE FEARED THAT  
THE EROSION PROCESS IN ALLIED DEFENSE POSTURES WOULD  
BECOME UNCONTROLLABLE.

( C) AS DEFMIN LEBER HAD EMPHASIZED, THE INCLUSION  
X- GDS-1  
HILLENBRAND

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INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ADP-00 NSC-10 NSCE-00 IO-03 OIC-01 L-02

CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 RSR-01 AEC-05 MBFR-02

ACDA-10 OMB-01 TRSE-00 EUR-10 NEA-06 PRS-01 SAJ-01

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R 201042 Z JUN 73

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5816

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USNMR SHAPE BRUSSELS

USDEL SALT

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 BONN 08785

LIMDIS

VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL; HELSINKI FOR MPT DEL; SHAPE FOR  
INTAF.

OF INDIGENOUS FORCE REDUCTIONS WAS REQUIRED BY THE POLITICAL REALITIES OF THE SITUATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC.

3. BAHR OBSERVED THAT, AFTER THE BREZHNEV TALKS HERE IN BONN, HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD APPROACH THIS WHOLE SUBJECT MOST CONSERVATIVELY. BREZHNEV HAD TALKED ABOUT SMALL REDUCTIONS, WHICH BAHR INTERPRETED TO MEAN PERHAPS ONE DIVISION IN THE GDR, DURING A FIRST PHASE, THEN A WAITING PERIOD TO BE FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER SIMILAR SMALL REDUCTION. IT WAS

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OBVIOUS THAT THE SOVIET LEADER DID NOT FEEL HIMSELF IN A POSITION TO PUSH FOR ANY MORE IN THE FACE OF ANTICIPATED OPPOSITION OF HIS MILITARY COMMANDERS. MOREOVER, THE SOVIETS, WHO WERE NOT UNINFORMED ABOUT AMERICAN OPINION AND CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES IN THIS AREA, PROBABLY FELT ALL THEY HAD TO DO WAS TO WAIT FOR A YEAR OR SO AND THEN INTERNAL PRESSURES IN THE US WOULD BRING ABOUT UNILATERAL FORCE REDUCTIONS. BAHR'S NET CONCLUSION WAS THAT PRESSURES ON THE SOVIETS TO MOVE RAPIDLY TOWARDS ANY SIGNIFICANT AND BALANCED REDUCTIONS WERE LAMENTABLY SMALL.

4. IN A SEPARATE JUNE 18 MEETING WITH EMBOFF, GERMAN MBFR DEL CHIEF RUTH ACKNOWLEDGED THE GROWING STRENGTH AND CONFIDENCE OF DEFMIN LEBER ON THE STATIONED/ INDIGENOUS ISSUE, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE SUPPORT OF BAHR. NONETHELESS, RUTH THOUGHT THE ALLIES EVENTUALLY MIGHT FIND AN ACCEPTABLE FORMULATION IN THE COPENHAGEN REMARKS OF FONMINS SCHEEL AND VAN DER STOEL. LIKE LEBER AT THE DPC, SCHEEL HAD SPOKEN OF " REACH( ING) AN UNDERSTANDING ALONG THE LINES OF US OPTION- I TO SEEK AN ARRANGEMENT IN ONE PAPER FOR STATIONED AND INDIGENOUS FORCES". SCHEEL ADDED THAT " REDUCTION OF STATIONED FORCES COULD TAKE PLACE YEARS BEFORE A SECOND PHASE INVOLVING REDUCTIONS OF INDIGENOUS FORCES" AND THAT " ELEMENTS OF ( US) OPTION- III COULD BE ADDED TO THIS ARRANGEMENT". ( NOTE: THE IMPORTANT WORD " YEARS" DOES NOT APPEAR IN THE OFFICIAL NATO TRANSCRIPT OF SCHEEL' S REMARKS. END NOTE)

5. RUTH SAID THE GERMANS UNDERSTAND VAN DER STOEL TO HAVE SUGGESTED PHASED MBFR NEGOTIATIONS ( I. E. US OPTION- I) PER AN " OVERALL PROGRAM" ( I. E. SCHEEL' S REFERENCE TO " PAPER"), WITH SOME TYPE OF " ASSURANCE" IN THE FIRST PHASE ( PERHAPS IN THE OVERALL PROGRAM-- PAPER) THAT THERE COULD BE POST- FIRST PHASE NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING INDIGENOUS FORCES. WHILE LEBER IS INSISTING

ON INCLUDING INDIGENOUS FORCES IN INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS  
WITH SEPARATE, LATER IMPLEMENTATION, AND WHILE FRG  
MAY IN ANY CASE NEED EARLIER NEGOTIATIONS ON INDIGENOUS  
FORCE CUTS THAN DO DUTCH, RUTH HOPED BONN MIGHT THIS

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SUMMER BE ABLE TO MOVE TOWARD SOME VARIATION OF THE  
ABOVE POSITION.

6. IN A SEPARATE LUNCHEON MEETING JUNE 19 WITH THE  
BRITISH EMBASSY EXPERT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY MATTERS,  
HELD AT THE LATTER'S REQUEST. EMBOFF WAS TOLD THAT  
HMG HAD NOTED THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT IN COPENHAGEN  
FAVORING INITIAL FOCUS ON STATIONED FORCE CUTS BUT WAS  
SOMEWHAT SURPRISED THAT THE US HAD NOT PUSHED HARDER  
IN THE DPC AND NAC MINISTERIALS FOR ITS POSITION AGAINST  
FRG POSTURE OF SIMULTANEOUS NEGOTIATION BUT SEPARATE  
IMPLEMENTATION OF STATIONED AND INDIGENOUS FORCE CUTS.  
BRITISH OFFICIAL SAID LEBER WAS NOW ARGUING WITHIN  
THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT THAT THE US PREFERRED INITIAL  
STATIONED FORCE CUT NEGOTIATIONS BUT WAS NOT PRESSING  
THE MATTER URGENTLY. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, BRITISH  
EMBOFF SAID UK WONDERED WHETHER US MIGHT IN THE END BE  
ABLE TO ACCEPT THIS FRG POSITION.

7. IN REPLY TO BRITISH OFFICIAL, EMBOFF SAID THAT  
THE SECRETARY'S NAC MINISTERIAL STATEMENT, LIKE THAT  
OF SECDEF- DESIGNATE SCHLESINGER AT BRUSSELS, HAD MADE  
CLEAR THE FIRM US VIEW THAT INITIAL MBFR NEGOTIATIONS  
SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON STATIONED FORCES, PARTICULARLY  
US AND SOVIET; BUT GIVEN THE LEBER STATEMENT AT THE  
JUNE 7 DPC AND THE GERMAN DEFENSE MINISTER'S JUNE 8  
DIE ZEIT INTERVIEW, CONFRONTATION AT THE NAC MINISTERIAL  
SEEMED UNWISE. NOW THAT THE FRG HAD BEEN CLEARLY  
ISOLATED IN COPENHAGEN, THE US HOPED THE ISSUE WOULD  
BE QUICKLY SETTLED IN NATO, ALONG THE LINES OF THE  
SECRETARY'S STATEMENT. IN THIS CONNECTION, EMBOFF  
EXPRESSED THE PERSONAL VIEW THAT A HIGH LEVEL DEMARCHE  
X- GDS-1  
HILLENBRAND

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ACTION PM-03

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ADP-00 NSC-10 NSCE-00 IO-03 OIC-01 L-02

CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 AEC-05 MBFR-02 ACDA-10

OMB-01 TRSE-00 EUR-10 NEA-06 PRS-01 SAJ-01 RSR-01

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R 201042 Z JUN 73

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5817

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

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USDEL SALT

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 03 BONN 08785

LIMDIS

VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL; HELSINKI FOR MPT DEL; SHAPE FOR  
INTAF.

BY BRITISH AND OTHER EUROPEAN ALLIES URGING THE FRG  
IN THE INTEREST OF ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY TO GO ALONG  
WITH INITIAL FOCUS ON STATIONED FORCE CUT NEGOTIATIONS  
COULD BE EXTREMELY HELPFUL.

8. BRITISH OFFICIAL SAID HE AGREED, AND UNDERSTOOD  
THE ADVANTAGES OF A EUROPEAN RATHER THAN US DEMARCHE,  
BUT THOUGHT SUCH A DEMARCHE WOULD HAVE TO BE AT THE  
POLITICAL LEVEL, PROBABLY TO THE CHANCELLOR, TO BE  
GENUINELY EFFECTIVE. BRITISH EMBOFF SAID HE THOUGHT  
LONDON WAS LIKELY TO ACCORD " SYMPATHETIC ATTENTION"

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TO AN APPROPRIATE US DEMARCHE SUGGESTING SUCH A  
BRITISH ( AND IF POSSIBLE BROADER EUROPEAN) APPROACH  
TO THE FRG. BUT GIVEN THE IMPORTANT SUPPORT LEBER  
HAD WON FROM BAHR AND HELMUT SCHMIDT, BRITISH EMBOFF  
ALSO SAID US MUST THEN MAKE UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR TO  
LONDON ( AND OTHER EUROPEAN ALLIES) ITS DETERMINATION

TO CONFINE INITIAL NEGOTIATION FOCUS TO STATIONED FORCES. BRITISH OFFICIAL SAID LONDON WAS NOT YET CONVINCED THAT WASHINGTON WAS OF ONE MIND ON THIS IMPORTANT MATTER.

9. COMMENT: EGON BAHR'S INTENTION TO PLAY A KEY ROLE IN THE MBFR/ CSCE AREAS IS A MATTER OF CONSIDERABLE BUREAUCRATIC AND POLITICAL IMPORTANCE. IT IS BOUND TO RESULT IN A BITTER DISPUTE BETWEEN SCHEEL AND BAHR OVER BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL OF THESE PROJECTS. GUIDO BRUNNER ( WITH SCHEEL'S SUPPORT) AND BAHR WILL INTENSIFY THEIR LONG STANDING QUARREL OVER THE IMPORTANCE OF CSCE. BRUNNER, DRAWING ON SUPPORT OF BONN'S OTHER EC- NINE COLLEAGUES, WILL ARGUE FOR TOUGH WESTERN CSCE POSITIONS AND PATIENT TACTICS; BAHR, WHO DISPARAGES THE IMPORTANCE OF CSCE, WOULD CONTINUE TO ACCORD MORE SYMPATHETIC EAR TO SOVIET AMB FALIN'S FREQUENT COMPLAINTS OVER " BRUNNER'S STALLING", WITH THE HOPE OF WINNING SOME SOVIET COUNTER- CONCESSIONS PERHAPS ON INNER- GERMAN MATTERS.

10. BUT BAHR'S NEW ROLE IS BOUND TO HAVE ITS MOST IMPORTANT IMPACT IN THE MBFR ENTERPRISE. IF BAHR IS IN FACT DETERMINED THAT INITIAL MBFR NEGOTIATIONS INCLUDE INDIGENOUS FORCES, IT WILL PROVE DIFFICULT TO BUDGE THE FRG, EVEN GIVEN HIGH LEVEL APPEALS. BAHR IS LIKELY TO WIN SUBSTANTIAL GROUND WITH HIS ARGUMENT THAT ASSYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET FORCES, THE CHIEF GOAL OF THE US, FRG AND THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE, IS ONLY PLAUSIBLE GIVEN WESTERN READINESS TO ACCEPT REDUCTIONS IN INDIGENOUS EUROPEAN FORCES ASSYMMETRICAL TO NATO.

11. RECOMMENDATION: GIVEN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WOULD APPEAR TO US BEST TO AVOID INJECTING THE

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UNITED STATES DIRECTLY AT THIS TIME INTO THIS INTERNAL GERMAN GOVT POLITICAL DISPUTE. INITIALLY, THE US MIGHT DO BETTER TO: ( A) MAKE WHOLLY CLEAR IN THE NAC, WITH SUPPORT OF THE ALLIES, OUR FIRM WISH FOR AN URGENT RESOLUTION OF THE STATIONED/ INDIGENOUS ISSUE TO THE EFFECT OF INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS ON STATIONED FORCE CUTS AND CONSTRAINTS WITHIN AN OVERALL WORK PROGRAM INVOLVING SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ALSO ON INDIGENOUS FORCES; ( B) ADVOCATE BRITISH ( AND IF POSSIBLE BROAD ALLIED EUROPEAN) DEMARCHE( S) AT HIGH LEVEL IN BONN. THESE TACTICS MAY PROVE UNSUCCESSFUL, BUT COULD AT LEAST SENSITIZE AND SOFTEN UP THE TOPGERMAN OFFICIALS TO OUR INTERESTS WITHOUT DIRECTLY INVOLVING US IN THIS DISPUTE. IT WOULD THEN BE POSSIBLE, IF WASHINGTON

CONSIDERS IT ADVISABLE, FOR THE USG TO WEIGH IN  
BILATERALLY AT THE APPROPRIATELY HIGH LEVEL. BUT  
GIVEN THE PRESENT STATE OF PLAY AMONG GERMAN MINISTERS  
AND KEY OFFICIALS, WE SHARE THE BRITISH EMBASSY'S  
ASSESSMENT THAT SUCH A US DEMARCHE WOULD HAVE TO BE  
PRESENTED TO THE CHANCELLOR TO HAVE ANY CREDIBLE  
PROSPECT OF SUCCESS. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE GIVEN  
THE CURRENT STATE OF AGITATION IN BONN OVER RELATED  
US STATEMENTS AND DEMANDS IN THE DEFENSE AND  
BURDENSARING FIELDS.  
HILLENBRAND

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\*\*\* Current Handling Restrictions \*\*\* LIMDIS

\*\*\* Current Classification \*\*\* SECRET



## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:**  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 20 JUN 1973  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** boyleja  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
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**Enclosure:** n/a  
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**Page Count:** 8  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Reference:** 73 BONN 8421  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** boyleja  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 09 AUG 2001  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <09-Aug-2001 by shawdg>; APPROVED <13-Sep-2001 by boyleja>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** <DBA CORRECTED> srp 980220  
**Subject:** MBFR: STATIONED/ INDIGENOUS FORCE REDUCTION ISSUE AFTER COPENHAGEN MINISTERIAL.  
**TAGS:** PARM, GW  
**To:** DOD  
PM  
SECSTATE WASHDC INFO HELSINKI  
LONDON  
MULTIPLE  
NATO BRUSSELS  
**Type:** TE

**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005